• Purpose: The paper examines the changes in the price impact of trades in the major Korean stock market following the introduction of disclosure to all traders of the top five brokers on the buy-side and the top five brokers on the sell-side of trades in real time for each stock in the KOSDAQ market.
Introduction
Transparency in stock markets is generally considered to lead to greater fairness, more efficient information acquisition and better governance. When it comes to the optimal design of a securities market the impact of transparency becomes more complicated, as important informed market participants may feel exposed in a fully transparent environment. The only stock exchange in the world that promotes transparency to the public is the Korean Exchange There are a few studies documenting the direct effect of the disclosure of broker IDs on market quality. For example, Foucault, et al. (2007) study the change from pre-to post-event 2 According to the Korean Exchange website, there is no separate member admission requirement for the Korean Stock Exchange and the KOSDAQ stock market. So naturally, members of one exchange can be members of the other exchange as long as they are registered in both markets. There is no interaction between the order flows of the two markets, so brokers are not required to route orders to the market with better quotes.
when the limit order book for stocks listed on Euronext Paris became anonymous in 2001, and find that spreads and volatility decline significantly. Comerton-Forde, et al. (2005) investigate a collection of stock exchanges, including the Korean Stock Exchange, and find that the policy of hidden broker IDs results in a decrease in relative bid-ask spreads and effective spreads in both Euronext Paris and the Tokyo Stock Exchange. They find higher relative bid-ask spreads and effective spreads in the Korean Stock Exchange with the opposite policy on broker ID disclosure. Comerton-Forde and Tang (2009) find a lower spread and decline in the level of order aggressiveness following the switch to anonymity in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Mercorelli, et al. (2008) look at the same event in the ASX and find an increase in information asymmetry and order book imbalances. examine the impact of the removal of broker mnemonics on the Sydney Futures
Exchange and document an improvement in liquidity. Poskitt, et al. (2011) provide contrasting results for the NZX50 in the New Zealand Stock Exchange, which show that market liquidity deteriorates in a more opaque market. In general, all of these studies use effective spreads, market depths or order book imbalance as market quality proxies.
The main contributions of this study are three-fold. Firstly, Hasbrouck (2009) and Qian (2011) show that correlation between market quality measures such as effective and relative spreads, permanent and temporary price impact, quoted depth, and trading volume are sometimes low. This suggests that these measures reflect different aspects of market quality. -Forde, et al. (2005) examine the effect of broker ID disclosure on market quality on the Korean Stock Exchange, using the top 250 stocks by market capitalization. Using the bid-ask spread, they find that liquidity improved by increased anonymity and adversely affected by decreased anonymity. This study examines different attributes of market quality including information-related and liquidity-related price impact of trades, contributing to the literature by revealing a more complete picture of the effects of the change in broker ID policy.
Comerton
Secondly, in the Korean Exchange, a qualified member of one local market is also a qualified member of the other local market. Thus, all traders have the option to trade in either of the local markets. Unlike other stock markets 3 all investors (including individuals) have been able to observe the broker IDs in both local markets since the policy change in the KOSDAQ Stock Market. Accordingly, their choices of trading venues prior to the policy change were likely to be affected by the transparency levels of the markets. Thus, the study of price impact in the most active stocks in the main stock exchange when the other local market implemented the same policy is worthwhile.
Thirdly, this study sheds light on the different effects of the policy on the information content of trades, conditional on a trade being informed prior to the change in transparency in the major market. Utilizing segmented analysis on uninformed and informed trades on each trade side, the paper provides evidence about whether informed (uninformed) trades contain more or less information after the change in transparency.
This paper finds that the information-related price impact of both buyer-and seller-initiated trades increases following the introduction of public broker IDs. The observable impact is higher for the uninformed than for the informed trades, especially on the buy side. Consistent with Hendershott and Jones' (2005) and Linnainmaa and Saar's (2012) interpretation, this finding implies greater private information is disclosed with faster price discovery in a more transparent market, which indicates a more efficient market. Uninformed traders are likely to benefit more from high transparency than the informed traders. The liquidity-related price impact of buy trades is shown to be higher when public investors are able to observe post-trade broker IDs, in which uninformed trades are more affected than informed trades.
However, sell trades provide the reverse direction. The study finds a lower temporary price effect of both of uninformed and informed trades in the more transparent market, with a smaller effect of uninformed trades. These mixed findings on the two trade sides are not consistent with the existing literature mentioned early in the paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional details. Section 3 presents the data description and methodology, while the results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Institutional details
The Korean Stock Exchange is a typical order-driven market, where buy and sell orders compete for best prices. The whole trading procedure -from order placement to trade confirmation -is conducted in an electronic order-driven system. Orders are matched during the trading hours according to price and time priority. The opening and closing prices are determined by call auctions. In the Korean Stock Exchange, every stock has a daily price variation limit set at ±15% of the previous day closing price. Orders outside this limit are rejected.
The Korean Stock Exchange opens from 9:00 a.m. stocks is disclosed to the public on a real time basis along with the aggregate order quantity of each side. From January 2002, the scope of the bid/ask information disclosed expanded to the ten best bid and ask quotations. This change was designed to prevent any attempt to mislead investors by placing unreasonably large orders (fake orders) at prices that are unlikely to be matched, i.e., intentionally increasing the aggregate order quantity of a certain issue. The identification of the five most active brokers has also been disseminated to the public since October 25 th 1999.
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5 The Korea Stock Exchange and KOSDAQ markets trade different stocks although some stocks have been cross-listed. The 50 stocks examined in the paper were traded in the Korea SE only.
Following Hendershott and Jones (2005) , permanent price impact is used as a simple measure of the amount of information in trades, a measure of adverse selection risk 6 . The more information trades contain, the more prices will move in the direction of the trade (up following purchases and down following sales). Traders incorporate the information in the order flow imbalance by permanently adjusting their quotes upwards (downwards) after a series of buy (sell) orders (Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ). Prior studies document that markets react differently to buyer-and seller-initiated transactions (see Keim and Madhavan (1996) , Gemmill (1996) , Koski and Michaely (2000) ). The literature also provides evidence of "the identification of the trade indicator as the key variable for extracting adverse selection from observable data" (see Mercorelli, et al. (2008) ). Thus, all analyses in this study are carried out separately on buyer-and seller-initiated trades. The Lee and Ready (1991) rule is employed to classify a trade as a buy (sell) if the associated trade price is above (below) the prevailing midpoint price. The tick rule categorizes all other trades. This rule classifies the transaction above (below) the previous price as a buy (sell). If there is no price change, but the previous tick change was up (down), then the trade is classified as a buy (sell).
Permanent price impact is defined as the change in the quote midpoint 30 minutes after the trade signed by the trade direction, following Bessembinder (2003) . This is referred to as 'permanent price effect to 30 minutes'. A temporary price effect measure is also employed to examine liquidity relating to price pressure. This proxy is defined as the difference between the midpoint prices prevailing at the subsequent trade less the current price. Two relative measures are equal to the two proxies scaled by the initial midpoint price.
All of the price impact measures are weighted using daily volume to take into account the volume effect and to minimize noise, which is consistent with Ting (2006) . The volume weight measures also reduce the skewness resulting from large trade size. The volume-weighted price effect is calculated as the sum of the product of the price effect and the traded volume divided by the total trading volume of the day.
All measures are calculated using intraday data and then averaged to produce one observation per stock per day 7 . The Student t-test is used to examine whether the means of the examined proxies are significantly different between the pre-and post-event periods.
Multivariate models are utilized to control factors other than the policy change that may A time trend variable is included in the regressions to capture daily changes in the dependent variable holding all other explanatory variables constant, and to prevent the possibility that the findings on design changes are simply due to trends. The time trend variable begins with a value of 1 and increases by 1 unit for each investigated day. As market conditions will affect the price movement, the variance of return is included in the model. Following Hendershott and Jones (2005) , volatility is derived for each stock per day by taking the daily difference between the logarithm of highest and lowest transaction price. The sample is split into 5 quintiles by market capitalization on January 4 th 1999, in which quintile 1 and 5 contain the smallest and largest stocks by market value, respectively. The division using stock sizes is consistent with Eom, et al. (2007) and Comerton-Forde and Tang (2009) . Table 1 reports the means of the volume-weighted relative temporary price effect, and the permanent price effect to 30 minutes for five size quintiles and for the full sample in the preperiod and the post-period. The change between the two periods is reported in 'Difference'
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Multivariate analysis
Following Foucault, et al. (2007) , this study applies stock fixed effects to control for some of the heterogeneity across stocks. The following model is estimated to measure the effect of public broker IDs on the two price impact proxies: Table 2 presents the results of the multivariate models for the price impact measures.
Fixed effect OLS results
<Insert Table 2 A univariate analysis of range-based volatility is implemented for the full sample and separately for each quintile. Table 3 presents the Student t-test to examine whether there is any statistically significant change in average range-based volatility prior to and after the event date of October 25 th 1999 for the full sample and the quintiles.
<Insert Table 3 here> Table 3 reports that the smallest stocks have a higher level of volatility after the change to disclosure of broker IDs. There is no significant statistical evidence of changes in volatility for larger stocks. However, overall the full sample experiences a higher level of volatility of 0.67% in the post-period. The findings and the results discussed in Section 4.2.1 suggest that price impact proxies and volatility may change simultaneously as a result of the broker ID disclosure policy. Thus, the results from the OLS regressions presented in Section 4.2.2 may be biased due to the endogenous control variable. As a result, a two stage least squared regression should be implemented to avoid biased results.
Fixed effect 2SLS results
Two Stage Least Squared (2SLS) models with stock fixed effect specification are estimated using two price effect measures that recognize volatility as a potentially endogenous control
Ln MCap and i S are used as instruments in which it
MCap is the daily market capitalization of stock i on day t . These are valid instruments as they are either pre-determined variables or obviously exogenous. The results are presented in Table 4 .
<Insert Table 4 here>
There is also almost no observable trend for the two price impact changes when the endogeneity of volatility is corrected using the instrumental variable method. The coefficient of interaction variable between broker dummy and volatility 2 β is significantly positive in all measures. Dummy coefficient 4 β is also significantly negative regardless of the trade initiations. Thus, the impact of transparency on price effect would be subject to changes in volatility as well. As a result, the final effect of transparency on the price impact is calculated The total effect of the broker ID disclosure is estimated using the coefficients 2 β and 4 β taken from the fixed effect 2SLS regressions presented in Table 4 and
Mean Volatility for the full sample and separately for each quintile taken from Table 3 . The results are reported in Table 5 .
<INSERT Table 5 here>
The first columns of Table 5 Looking at the changes in the two proxies for the quintiles, the smallest stocks (quintile 1) experience the highest increases in price impact over all time horizons, with approximately 13.3% and 39.0% increases for the temporary and 30 minute horizons, respectively. The impact mitigates as the stock size increases from quintile 2 to quintile 4, at less than 10% for the temporary measure for both quintiles, and from 16% to 7%, respectively, for the permanent measure to 30 minutes. However, price impact for the largest stocks (quintile 5) significantly falls in the post-period by 2.1% for the temporary measure and 14.0% for the 30-minute measure.
Overall, the results imply that private information contained in the informed buyer-initiated trades is higher in the market following the disclosure of broker IDs to the public, especially for the smallest stocks. The informed buy trades for the largest stocks contain less private information, as the public can obtain the five most active broker IDs for each stock free of charge. Temporary price impact is a proxy of liquidity provider's compensation. The study documents a lower liquidity-related price impact of trade for the largest stocks, and adversely effect on the smaller shares. This finding suggests that in the more transparent market, informed traders might have to trade more aggressively and strategically to reserve their relative advantage. As a result, competition in liquidity provision could become stronger in large but weaker in small market segments. The results for uninformed trades initiated by purchasers are reported in the second column of Table 5 . Similarly to the informed sample, the price impact of uninformed buyer-initiated trades in the post-period is higher than in the pre-period in the full sample. The temporary price effect and the permanent price effect to 30 minutes increases by 16% and 17%, respectively, in the post-period. This figure for uninformed trades presents a greater rise than for informed buyer-initiated trades.
The temporary price effect of the uninformed trades is larger in the post-period, which is in the range of 9% to 24% for the largest to the smallest stocks, respectively. These increases for uninformed trades are much higher than for informed trades on the buy side of the same quintiles. A reasonably similar pattern of changes is found in the permanent price impact to 30 minutes.
These outcomes suggest that uninformed traders are likely to benefit more from a transparent market than informed traders, which is consistent with Hendershott and Jones (2005) . In an anonymous market, informed trades contain a certain amount of private information; meanwhile, uninformed traders lack information. When the market is more transparent, uninformed traders become quasi-informed and are able to incorporate newly disclosed information in their executed orders. The previous literature shows that seller-initiated trades usually convey less information than buyer-initiated trades. Panel 1 in the third column of Table 5 shows that the temporary price impact of informed sell trades reduces after the introduction of broker ID disclosure by 28%, 20%, 18%, 18% and 11% for quintiles 1 (smallest stocks) to 5 (largest stocks), respectively. Overall, the impact falls by 19% for the full sample. A similar effect occurs for uninformed sell trades in the post-period, but is smaller in magnitude. The liquidity related price effect declines by approximately 17%, 10%, 8%, 8%, and 2% for quintiles 1 to 5, respectively, and 9% for the full sample. These results suggest an improvement in liquidity for sell trades initiated by both uninformed and informed traders in a market with a higher level of transparency. The changes in the temporary price impact of buy trades are less than that of sell trades initiated by informed traders.
Nevertheless, the opposite is documented for trades created by uninformed traders.
The changes in the informational effect of informed sell trades after the disclosure of broker IDs are presented in the third column of Table 5 , in Panel 2. The price effect to 30 minutes increases by 25.8% and 5.8% for the two smallest stock quintiles, but decreases by 1.5% and 2.0% for the two largest stocks quintiles, leading to an overall rise of 1.4% in the entire postperiod market. Uninformed sell trades experience a strong increase in the informational price effect measures by 51.0% for the smallest stocks; approximately 5.0% for the largest stocks and 26.8% for the full sample (see Table 5 , Panel 2, column 4).
Compared to the buy trades, the increase in the permanent price impact is less for uninformed and greater for uninformed seller-initiated trades. The fall in temporary price impact of trade for seller-initiated trades, which is opposite to buyer-initiated trades, indicates that the asymmetry between buyer and seller-initiated trades proposed by Saar (2001) holds.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the changes in temporary and permanent price impact in the major stock market in Korea when the second local market began displaying the same transparency level of broker IDs to the public. This study uses an intraday dataset of the top 55 stocks by the average market capitalization over three years from 1999-2001. The paper makes an attempt to address the potential endogeneity of other market quality proxies that are used as control variables in price impact regressions by utilizing two stage least square methods with fixed effect specification.
This study finds that both buy and sell trades convey more private information when the broker IDs become observable to the public in the Korean Exchange. Uninformed traders benefit more from the increased transparency than informed traders, which is reflected in the higher permanent price impact of the uninformed trades in comparison to the informed trades on both buy and sell sides.
The findings are in agreement with Rindi (2008) , who states that under full transparency, The study supports the current policy of the Korean Exchange to publicly display the five most active broker IDs for each stock on both buy and sell sides, as it attracts both informed and liquidity traders, leading to faster price discovery in a more transparent market. However, a future study which analyzes the change in the market quality in both local markets would provide a complete picture about the impact of the policy. 
